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ARGUMENT 
I. In Response To The State's Proposed Standard of Review On The Denial Of a 
Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea (Brief of Appellee, State's Brief at p.l "SB") 
In State v. Beckstead, this Court discussed the different standards of review of a 
sentencing court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea. 2006 UT 42, f^ 8, 140 P.zd 
1288: 
T]he ultimate question of whether the sentencing court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question 
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Id. at ^|8. The correctness standard for 
reviewing the lawfulness of the underlying plea operates in most instances to 
neutralize the abuse of discretion standard for rulings on motions to withdraw 
pleas. Id. This is because an appellate determination of sentencing-court-
compliance error will almost certainly rise to the level of an abuse of discretion in 
the instance when a sentencing court denies a motion to withdraw a plea that was 
not accompanied by strict compliance with constitutional and procedural 
requirements. Id. (citations omitted) 
IL The Plea Court's Communication of the Burden of Proof Did Not Also Cover the 
Right to a Presumption of Innocence. (Response to SB. at 26-28) 
It remains undisputed that the plea court in Mr. Lovell's case conducted its plea 
proceedings according to an outdated version of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The Rule 23B court found that "[ajlthough the trial judge verbally informed 
Mr. Lovell of all the required elements of the previous Rule 11, nowhere did the plea 
colloquy or Plea Statement expressly inform Lovell that he had the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury." (R 2937). The State has made 
1 
alternative arguments that the plea court actually strictly complied with Rule 11. (Brief of 
Appelle hereinafter referred to as "SB" at 26-32). The State argued in the first place that 
the plea court properly communicated the Rule 11 rights at the plea hearing, (SB 28) and 
second, that the "record" to be reviewed includes prior trial experience and other 
information outside the record of the plea hearing itself. (SB 26). 
The State argues that the plea court strictly complied with Rule 11 because it 
actually did communicate each of the separately enumerated rights to Mr. Lovell. (SB 
26). However, the State cannot and does not dispute the fact that the plea court 
inadvertently left out one of the rights required under Rule 11(e)(3), the 'presumption of 
innocence'. (SB 26). According to the State, even though the 'presumption of 
innocence' and the State's burden to "prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" are listed 
separately under Rule 11, a plea court need only communicate the later since it also 
communicates the former. (Id.). 
The 'presumption of innocence' and the 'State's burden to prove each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt are two separate and distinct rights listed in separate sections 
of Rule 11: Rule 11(e)(3) and Rule 11(e)(4)(a). If these two rights were the same rights 
then Rule 11 would not have been specifically altered to add the presumption of 
innocence. Both the pre-1993 and post-1993 amended Rule 11(e) include the state's 
'burden to prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt' as one 
of the separately enumerated rights a plea court must communicate to a defendant before 
accepting a guilty plea. Utah R. Crim. PA 1(e)(3); Utah R. Crim. PA 1(e)(4)(A). 
2 
The two rights represent different concepts since it is possible to have no 
'presumption of innocence' along with the burden of proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt'; 
or a presumption of innocence with a different burden, such as 'clear and convincing.' 
As they are separate and distinct concepts and rights, the plea court in Mr. Lovell's case 
did not strictly comply with Rule 11. Therefore, Mr. Lovell had good cause to withdraw 
his plea and by law it was abuse of discretion to refuse him the privilege. State v. Smith, 
111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989). 
III. The Reviewing Court May Not Rely On Evidence or Information Outside 
The Record of the Plea Hearing. (Response to SB at 17, 22-25) 
It has been clear since Gibbons that "the record" discussed by this Court when 
reviewing strict compliance is the record created at the plea hearing. State v.Maguire, 
830 P.2d 216, 217. This concept could not be more clearly stated than in Maguire when 
this Court was discussing the use of plea affidavits: 
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 compliance be demonstrated on 
the record at the time the . . . plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit is 
used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea 
hearing. 
Maguire at 217. In making the determination of whether the plea court strictly 
complied with Rule 11 , this Court may consider Mr. Lovell's plea colloquy and any 
other documents properly incorporated into the record. Maguire at U 217. Other than Mr. 
Lovell's plea affidavit, there is no indication that the plea court attempted to incorporate 
any other documents into the record. The 23B court relied upon unincorporated 
documents such as the jury questionnaire, Mr. Lovell's motion to suppress, and 
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transcripts from other hearings such as the pre-plea pre-trial conference and the 2005 
evidentiary hearing transcript. (SB 30, 31, 32, 36) Moreover, the Rule 23B court and the 
State would have this Court embark on an expedition to uncover the past experience of 
Mr. Lovell in order to cure any strict compliance violation. (SB 22-26). 
The State has argued that Mr. LovelFs argument against using previous trial 
experience was first made on appeal and should be considered under a plain error 
standard. (SB 22). This Appeal, however, is the first time that Mr. Lovell has been able 
to respond to the reviewing district court's opinion. Furthermore, Mr. Lovell set out in 
specific terms the many different rights that were not communicated by the plea court 
during the Rule 11 colloquy. Those claims were set out in memorandum form prior to 
argument before the Rule 23B court. See R. 2296-2429. Included was Mr. Lovell's 
motion and renewed motions to withdraw his plea with accompanying memoranda. The 
substantive issue before the Rule 23B hearing court was not whether the court could 
consider past trial experience but whether there was a strict compliance violation. In 
short, this is simply a State proposed theory. It should be noted however, that Mr. Lovell 
did address the issue in argument below. (See R. 2861). 
Furthermore, this Court in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1252 n. 11, stated: 
The State suggests that Laffertyfs failure to make the appropriate objections 
and challenges in the trial court has some bearing on the merit of his claim. 
The State apparently contends that the trial court did not err because 
Lafferty did not object. Because the actual existence of error obviously 
does not depend on proper objections or challenges, we can only assume 
that the State intended to argue that Laffertyfs claim of error could not be 
4 
raised for the first time on appeal. This argument is without merit. It is well 
established that on direct appeal in capital cases this Court, will consider all 
claims of error raised and briefed on appeal, regardless of any failure to 
object below. E.g., State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 546; State v. Norton, 675 
P.2d at 581; State v. Wood, 648 P.2d at 77; State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1345 
&n. 9. 
Despite the obvious error on the part of the plea court, that is the reliance upon an 
outdated version of Rule 11, the State argues that the relevant question in this case is 
"whether Loveil's prior trial experience was apparent from the record before the plea 
court." SB. at 25. Moreover, the "record" the State seeks to use is information outside of 
the record of the plea hearing. (SB 26). 
Mr. LovelPs previous trial and court experience could not have been a basis for 
Mr. Lovell's plea colloquy as to the three new rights because the trial judge that actually 
conducted the colloquy was working from a faulty knowledge of Rule 11 and therefore 
made no attempt at strict compliance of the presumption of innocence and impartial jury 
rights. In essence, what the State is suggesting is that this Court replace strict compliance 
with a subjective analysis, in hindsight, of what a defendant may or may not have been 
understanding when the plea was taken. 
The State's argument relies heavily on a single passage from Corwell which reads 
as follows: "Therefore, we hold that the test of whether a district court strictly complies 
with Rule 11 (e) is not whether the court recites the phrases found in that Rule. Rather 
the test is whether the record adequately supports the district court's conclusion that the 
defendant had a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of Rule 11(e)." State 
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v. Corwell 2005 UT 28 at f 18, 114 P.3d 569. However, Corwell indicates no change in 
the past 20 years of strict compliance related authority from this Court since Gibbons. Id. 
The State, however, would suggest that the above language from Corwell would allow an 
extra-record piece of information to support a finding of strict compliance and would not 
limit the review to the plea proceeding. The State also relies on State v. Visser for this 
argument. 2000 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242 (SB 22-25). Niether Visser nor Corwell 
considered the defendant's previous trial experience as a basis for a finding of a violation 
of Rule 1 lstrict compliance. 
In Visser, the defendant's trial experience the day that he changed his plea was 
simply considered as part of the context for determining the adequacy of the district 
court's communication to the defendant. Visser at f 16. The fact that the plea court 
knew that the defendant in Visser had already received and experienced the benefit of the 
right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury did not relieve the plea court judge from 
informing him about the consequences resulting from his decision to plead guilty with 
respect to those rights. The plea court informed Visser that "he had a right to continue 
with the trial and would 'have the right to see that the trial is conducted fairly and 
properly.'" Id. This communication fulfilled the plea court's duty to personally establish 
on the record, that Visser understood his right to trial by an impartial jury before he gave 
up that right and pled guilty. Id. 
Similarly, This Court contextually considered Corwell's direct trial experience but 
did not use it as an independent basis for a Rule 11 finding. Again, the Corwell decision 
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turned on the adequacy of the district court's communication to Corweil about her speedy 
triai right. Corweil at f 22. This Court held that "[i]n light of the fact that Corwell's trial 
was scheduled to begin just one business day after the day on which she entered her plea, 
the district court's repeated warning that Corwell's decision to plead guilty would result 
in her giving up her 'trial next Monday' communicated as much, if not more, about the 
timing of Corwell's trial than would its use of the generic and abstract phrase "'speedy 
trial.'" Corweil at ^ 19. The "district court fully satisfied the demands of strict 
compliance on the plea record when it adequately informed Corweil of her right to a 
speedy trial, using a modified phrase to fit Corwell's particular circumstances." Corweil 
at f 22. 
The State's reading of Corweil would fundamentally restructure a district court's 
role in the plea process from an active one of communication at the time of the plea to a 
passive one of broad record review. This Court, however, has specifically rejected the 
argument that Post-Gibbons strict compliance merely recommends "the best method of 
determining the voluntariness of a plea...." State v. Hoff 814P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 
1991). Instead, State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) established strict 
compliance as both the standard and practice for taking guilty pleas. Id. {"Gibbons was 
indeed intended to change both the practice and the standard for taking guilty 
pleas. ") (emphasis added). The idea that Corweil or Visser instructs a plea court to 
reverse that long standing practice is flawed and would seriously compromise the now-
settled plea process. Their reliance on those cases is not only misplaced, it also sets back 
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the strides made over the past 20 years to ensure that pleas are knowingly and voluntarily 
made. Under the State's argued version, taken to its logical conclusion, a plea court may 
properly ignore strict compliance to Rule 11(e)(3) altogether so long as the record before 
he plea court includes a defendant's prior criminal conviction. 
Two years after Corwell, this Court again clarified Rule 11 strict compliance as it 
has since Gibbons in State v. Beckstead: 
Over time we have made clear that a sentencing judge 
must communicate to a defendant the full complement of 
information found in Rule 11 concerning the rights he is 
relinquishing by pleading guilty. The Sentencing judge 
must then receive from the defendant an affirmation that 
he committed the offense to which he is pleading guilty, 
that he knows of and understands the rights he is 
surrendering. State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, TflO, 140 
P.3d 1288 {emphasis added). 
Therefore the question is not whether the sentencing court can find that the 
defendant subjectively understood the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty. Rather, the 
question is whether, on the record, the court actively communicated each enumerated 
Rule 11 right to the defendant. While the goal of strict compliance is to ensure that the 
defendant understands his rights before pleading guilty, this court has repeatedly made 
clear that "strict compliance in the context of guilty plea review refers to a sentencing 
judge's duty to communicate comprehensively and without deviation the substantive 
information required to be imparted by Rule 11. " Beckstead }^ 14 (emphasis added). The 
State's approach would essentially result in a court conducting a post-hoc analysis of the 
record for indications that the defendant subjectively understood his Rule 11 rights rather 
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than ensuring that the defendant does by communicating them during the plea colloquy. 
Also, the State's method would abscond a sentencing judge's two-part duty to (1) 
communicate each of the Rule 11 rights and then to (2) ensure that the defendant 
understood them. Gibbons at 1313-14. 
According to the State, the plea court strictly complied with Rule 11 because the 
case record provided assurance to the court that Mr. Lovell understood his rights before 
the court accepted his guilty plea. (SB 25). The State reasons that this determination 
properly relied on the record before the court which included the fact that Mr. Lovell had 
two prior criminal convictions—some 8 and 15 years before his plea hearing in this case. 
(Id.) The relevant question for the State is not whether the plea court communicated each 
of the enumerated Rule 11 rights to Mr. Lovell but "whether Lovell's prior trial 
experience was apparent from the record before the plea court." (Id.) The State's reliance 
on Visser and Corwell for its argument is misplaced as those cases, like Gibbons and 
Beckstead, require evidence of the communication on the plea hearing record. 
IV. The Rule 23B Court Violated Strict Complianced as to Rule 11(e)(3), The 
Right To A Speedy Trial Before An Impartial Jury. (Response to SB at 29-
32} 
The 23B court found that neither the plea colloquy nor Plea Statement expressly 
informed Mr. Lovell that he had the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury. 
(R. 2937). Like the presumption of innocence, the plea court never attempted to 
communicate this right to the defendant because it was not listed in the outdated version 
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of Rule 11. (R. 2937). The State claims, however, that the right was adequately covered 
by the plea court. (SB 30). 
First, the State specifically cites to a single statement Mr. Lovell's attorney made 
to the court at the beginning of the plea hearing transcript: "this would have been the day 
to begin jury selection in his trial for Aggravated Murder and Aggravated kidnapping." 
(SB 30, citing, R656). 
Second, the State cites to the following passage from the plea colloquy: 
The Court: Do you understand that if you -if you plead guilty that you will be 
admitting that you've done what you've been charged with doing. 
Mr. Lovell: Yes, sir. 
The Court: You'll be admitting that you took the life of- of Ms. Yost, that there 
was no legal justification for your taking her life, and that that was for the purpose 
of preventing her from testifying against you at trial. As I understand, it was a 
rape trial in Davis County; is that correct? 
Mr. Caine: That's correct, Your Honor 
(SB 31, citing R. 659). 
Third, the State generally cites the plea hearing record for the proposition that the 
"plea court knew that a jury had already convicted Lovell of kidnapping and raping Ms. 
Yost." (SB 31, citing R. 676-78). This cited portion of the transcript includes no basis 
for such a finding. Instead, at the request from the prosecutor, the plea court attempted to 
review the factual basis of Mr. Lovell's plea pursuant to Rule 11(b). (R. 676). The plea 
court asked Mr. Daines to set forth the factual basis of Mr. Lovell's plea. (Id.). Mr. 
Daines stated that Mr. Lovell had been previously charged with two felonies for 
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aggravated sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping of Joyce Yost and that those 
charges "took place actually in the early summer of 1985." (R. 677). Mr. Daines told the 
plea court that the "[t]rial was scheduled for that case about mid-August of 1985." (Id.) 
Although Mr. Daines later noted that "the trial went on anyway," he never stated that it 
was a jury trial. (Id.) The plea affidavit did state that "I know that I have a righf to a tral 
by a jury," and that "a unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict me." (R.238). 
But the plea court never reviewed this right with Lovell other than generically asking him 
if he understood the affidavit. (R. 689). Finally, with respect to the 'public trial' aspect of 
this right, the State failed to provide a single record citation supporting the notion that 
this was communicated to the defendant. Nothing in the state's argument can cure the 
fact that the plea court was not working from the updated version of Rule 11 and did not 
communicate the right to an impartial jury. 
V. Rule 11 Strict Compliance Violations On Direct Appeal Do Not require A 
Harmless Error Argument. (Response to SB. at 39-51) 
The State acknowledged: "The Utah court of Appeals has held that failure to 
strictly comply with Rule 11 constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a plea as a matter of 
law. See, e.g., State v. Mills, 898 p.2d 819-22 (Utah App. 1994). While this Court has 
never expressly equated the two standards, it has stated that on direct appeal from the 
denial of a motion to withdraw, "'failure to strictly comply with [Rule 11] would be 
grounds for reversal.'" Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, % 18, 173 P.3d 842 (quoting 
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, n.6 (Utah 1993)). (SB 14). However, the State has 
argued that what this Court really meant when it adopted the strict compliance standard 
11 
was that even if there was a violation, if it were a "technical violation" then a harmless 
error analysis should apply and the defendant should have to show prejudice. It is 
unclear what the State considers to be a "technical" violation. 
The State relies primarily upon State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1301-1302 (Utah 
1986) in support of its argument that a showing of prejudice is required in order for a 
defendant to withdraw a plea. (SB 41-2). However, Kay was not a case of a defendant 
attempting to withdraw a plea. See Kay at 1296-97. In fact, the State was the party 
attempting to withdraw the plea. Indeed, Kay was a plurality opinion and it is actual dicta 
in Kay that the State cites to for its position. See Id. at 1307-10. Justices Stewart and 
Howe, and then Chief Justice Hall filed their own concurring opinions. Id. at 1301-1302. 
Justice Zimmerman writing for this Court and joined by Justice Durham, after chastising 
the State for its attempt to "renege" on a bargain with the defendant, and noting that 
Chief Justice Hall and Justice Howe would adopt a strict Rule 11 compliance from their 
concurring opinion, listed the potential problems with withdrawing a plea for all Rule 11 
violations. Id. It was obvious dicta and the next year this Court decided Gibbons. The 
State is simply wrong and the long line of cases from Gibbons to the present leaves no 
doubt that prejudice and harmless error do not apply to direct appeal strict compliance 
challenges. 
Two years after Gibbons, this Court reversed a denial of a motion to withdraw a 
plea based upon a Rule 11(e)(5) violation - a misstatement regarding the defendant's 
possible sentence- with no requirement of a showing of prejudice. State v. Smith, 111 
12 
P.2d 464, 465-66 (Utah 1989). In State v. Smith, this court held that a district court's 
failure to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) required the vacating of the defendant's guilty 
plea. Smith at 466. 
In order for defendant's guilty plea to be valid 
and in compliance with Rule 11(e)(5) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and State v. Gibbons, the record 
must show that he was unequivocally and clearly 
informed about the sentence that would be imposed. 
Such evidence does not exist either in the affidavit 
regarding the plea bargain or in the transcript of the 
guilty plea. Thus, Rule 11(e) and State v. Gibbons 
require the vacating of defendant's guilty plea on the 
ground that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
Smith at 466. Two years after Smith, this Court took up State v. Maguire, to more fully 
explain the proper post-Gibbons application of strict compliance. Maguire, at 217. The 
Maguire court did not announce a requirement that a defendant show prejudice in order 
to withdraw his plea. In line with Smith, the Maguire Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction holding that "there was insufficient compliance with Rule 11 to sustain the 
entry of the guilty plea." Maguire at 218. 
Following Maguire, this Court reversed the trial court's denial of a defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in State v. Thurman because the trial court failed to 
strictly comply with Rule 11(e)(2). State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d371 (Utah 1996). The 
Thurman decision did not require or even comment on whether the defendant suffered 
prejudice. Id. 
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In Salazar v. State, this Court held that on collateral appeal a district court's failure 
to strictly comply with Rule 11 is not an automatic ground for reversal absent the 
deprivation of a constitutional right. Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). 
This Court was careful to reiterate its position with respect lo Rule 11 violations on direct 
appeal as follows: 
We stress that we are not retreating from our 
holding in State v. Gibbons, that the trial court 
must strictly comply with Rule 11. If this were a 
direct appeal from a denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, for example, failure to 
strictly comply with the Rule would be grounds 
for reversal. 853 P.2d 988, 991 fnl (Utah 1993). 
This Court again reiterated that on "direct appeal from a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea,.. .failure to strictly comply with [Rule 11] would be grounds for reversal" in 
Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90 at U 18, 173 P.3d 842. 
Interestingly, the State offers no evidence or support that would lead this Court to 
believe that strict compliance is not working. The State provides nothing showing a need 
to split from past precedent leaving Mr. Lovell to surmise that strict compliance has 
actually been working well to ensure knowing and voluntary pleas. Yet the State would 
have this Court make this drastic redefinition on a capital case where the plea should 
have been withdrawn fifteen years ago. 
14 
VI. Knowing and Voluntary Standard and the Constitutional Right to a Unanimous 
Jury Require A Similar Strict Compliance Analysis as Other Important 
Constitutional Rights That Are Covered By Rule 11. (Response to SB. at 52-57) 
Mr. Lovell argued before the Rule 23B court that a Rule 11 violation occurred 
when the plea court misstated the law regarding the unanimity requirement of the jury on 
a specific aggravating factor. R. 1844-45, LovelVs Memorandum Supporting Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea and Request For Hearing, pp. 14-15. Mr. Lovell argued that his 
guilty plea was not voluntarily made based upon this misstatement of law. Id. Mr. 
Lovell cited Rule 11(e)(2) but also Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution and State 
v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59 U 61, 992 P.2d 951, 967. Id. 
On appeal, Mr. Lovell argued that a due process violation under Article I, section 
7 of the Utah Constitution occurred when the plea court misstated the law as to the 
requirement of jury unanimity on a specific aggravating factor in a capital case. (Br. Apt. 
44-47). Mr. Lovell also argued that it violated Rule 11(e)(2) and could not have been a 
knowing and voluntary waiver pursuant to Boykin. Id. 
The State has argued that Mr. Lovell has abandoned his Rule 11 argument in favor 
of his state due process argument. (SB 56). Mr. Lovell did not intend to abandon his 
arguments made before the Rule 23B court, and indeed, he cited to Rule 11 and the 
knowing and voluntary standard in his opening brief. (Appellant's Br. 44-49). The 
violation, however, is a more complicated strict compliance problem since Rule 11 does 
not cite to the jury unanimity right. This is perplexing since it is a very important right 
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set out in detail in the Utah Constitution at Article I, section 10. l Mr. Lovell has also 
briefed this error under a state constitutional due process analysis. (Appellant's Br. 42-
44). 
The State has argued that this misstatement of the law is ambiguous. SB 56. The 
statement in question is an unambiguous and certainly incorrect statement of the law. In 
argument below, however, the State admitted: "but a fair reading is that the Court told 
Lovell that not all twelve jurors would have to agree on the specific aggravating factor. 
The law requires such unanimity." (R. 2702). 
While there may be nothing in Rule 11 that requires that a criminal client, and 
especially capital client, be appropriately informed about and waive his right to a 
unanimous jury, the fact is that the right is stated with extreme particularity in Article I, 
section 10 and was well defined in Tillman v. Cook, and State v. Saunders. Tillman v, 
Cook, 855 P.2d 211 at 221-222 (Utah 1993)(plurality opiniom); State v. Saunders, 1999 
UT 59, Tf 64, 992 P.2d 951. The same principles behind strict compliance apply here. In 
State v. Hqffl 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1191), this court noted that the Rule in Gibbons 
was adopted to ensure that a plea was "truly knowing and voluntary" and that if it was 
"meticulously adhered to" it would discourage future collateral attacks. 
1
 While Mr. Lovell briefed the state constitutional argument under a plain error analysis 
because it was raised first on appeal, this is a direct appeal from a capital case and this 
Court, as discussed above, may review any issue raised on appeal. See Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
at 1252 n. 11 
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It is difficult to comprehend that other constitutional rights covered by Rule 11 are 
more important that the right a capital client has to a unanimous jury. The policies 
behind the strict compliance policy of Gibbons certainly apply as here as well. It cannot 
be said with any degree of integrity that when such an important constitutional right is 
actually misstated and articulated in a way that a defendant could only assume it was to 
his detriment, that there was a voluntary and knowing waiver of that important 
constitutional right. This Court should require a strict compliance analysis for this 
constitutional right as well. 
VII. Ineffectiveness Of Counsel Issues Raised Below Were Not Adequately 
Investigated And Presented Making It Impossible For Mr. Lovell To Adequately 
Brief Those Issues. (Response to SB. at 58-68) 
Mr. LovelPs position as to possible ineffectiveness claims has been clearly set out 
in motion form (See, Renewed Motion for Appointment of Investigator, Experts .... Filed 
with this Court February 4, 2008; Motion to Clarify Issues on Remand, Filed with this 
Court November 30, 2007) before this Court and again in his opening brief. Br. 
Appellant at 51 n. 8. Mr. Lovell's position has been that the remand in this case to the 
district court was limited to the issues raised in Mr. LovelFs original and renewed 
motions to withdraw his plea and that no competent investigation into ineffectiveness 
claims was conducted below in the Rule 23B Court. Id. Mr. Lovell therefore does not 
have the ability to adequately brief the issues on the merits of ineffective assistance 
claims addressed by the Rule 23B court. The State argued that Mr. Lovell did not 
adequately brief his ineffectiveness issue in subpoint A, arguing that this Court therefore 
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need not reach the issue. (SB 58-60). Since Mr. Lovell does not have the ability to 
adequately brief the merits of the ineffectiveness claims listed by the Rule 23B court, he 
is in the impossible situation of attempting to provide this Court and the State with what 
facts are available to him to show that those claims raised below have not been 
adequately developed. The claims raised below may very well support a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel that affected the plea process. However, Mr. LovelPs 
Rule 23B counsel admitted that there was little if any investigation into ineffectiveness 
issues beyond what was available to them from the court record and obviously through 
Mr. Lovell and Mr. Caine. (Affidavit of James M. Retallick ffl[ 2-5, filed with this Court 
Oct. 2007). 
Rule 23B counsel, after conducting the Rule 23B hearing, filed an appeal and 
subsequently opening appellant's brief. Initially, counsel did not brief any 
ineffectiveness issues. Rule 23B counsel then filed a motion to supplement the brief with 
this Court May 22, 2007. In that motion counsel indicated "in deciding how to proceed 
[presumably with the appeal], it was erroneously believed by counsel that any issues 
concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel as it related to Appellant's knowing and 
voluntary plea would best be addressed in a post conviction habeas corpus action. This 
confusion was compounded by the 23B court's reference to a pending 65C motion for 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the sentencing hearing (See R. 2969, a copy of which 
is attached.)" Appellant's Motion To Supplement Brief, %5, Filed with this Court, May 
22, 2007. The motion then states that counsel had recently learned that failure to raise 
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issues may bar them in post conviction proceedings and therefore counsel sought to 
supplement the brief Id. This Court granted that motion on May 25, 2007. On June 14, 
2007, Rule 23B counsel for Mr. Lovell filed: Appellant's Motion To Appoint Qualified 
Appellate Counsel To Re-Brief Issues. In an affidavit attached to that motion, counsel 
stated at ^ 5 " I have struggled with this case, being unfamiliar with appellate procedures 
and having only minor experience in handling appeals. Those appeals I have handled 
dealt with fairly simple and basic issues . . . . " Counsel then requested that qualified 
counsel be appointed. Counsel then filed a follow-up affidavit on June 22, 2007 stating 
that he was not qualified under Rule 8 and 38B of the Rules of Crim. P. and App. P. 
respectively. This Court granted that request and present counsel was appointed. Rule 
23B counsel for Mr. Lovell, on October 25, 2007, filed another affidavit stating that it 
was his understanding that ineffectiveness issues would be handled at another post-
conviction hearing and therefore no investigator, mitigation expert or other experts were 
retained. Affidavit of James M. Retallick, H1I2-5. Additionally he stated that he did not 
have the experience to deal with such post-conviction matters. Id. 
What is clear from what is known is that there was no real investigation into 
possible ineffectiveness issues and, as discussed above, there was real confusion about 
the scope of the issues to be dealt with at the Rule 23B hearing. Id. The following 
exchange at oral argument before the Rule 23B court highlights another problem: 
The Court: I do have one question. Counsel raised in his brief an absence 
of certain evidence that could have been presented in the death penalty 
phase. And maybe this doesn't have anything to do with the plea, but he 
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raised the issue about the ABA Guidelines. Do you want to address that for 
just a moment? 
Mr. Brunker (for the State): I - 1 think the most direct answer to that is 
whatever the ABA Guidelines demanded at the penalty phase is irrelevant 
to the plea. It may be relevant when the postconviction case begins 
The Court: All right. Fair enough. I - 1 think I see your point and I agree. 
Thanks. 
(R. 2990, pp. 84-85). As discussed in Mr. Lovell's opening brief, (Br. Appellant 56-59) 
the ABA guidelines do not only deal with penalty phase issues and there could be much 
in the way of so-called mitigation evidence that may very well go to the issue of a 
knowing and voluntary plea. One of those significant issues would be mental health 
evidence. 
Prior to the Rule 23B hearing there was argument on the boundaries and issues 
that would be allowed to be argued at the Rule 23B hearing. R. 2993. In that hearing, 
the State acknowledged that this Court remanded Mr. Lovell's hearing only to deal with 
his original and renewed motions to withdraw his plea. R. 2993, pp. 14-15. There was 
considerable confusion at the time regarding the scope of the issues that would be 
allowed at the Rule 23B hearing. The State's position was that the remand hearing was 
limited to any grounds stated in the original and renewed motions. Id. Upon follow up 
by the court, counsel for Mr. Lovell explained: " . . . and to give some comfort to the 
State, we're not alleging additional specific legal issues as far as to withdraw the guilty 
2
 Mr. Lovell has referred to the district court, where the evidentiary hearing on his 
motions to withdraw his plea, as the Rule 23B court, and the hearing as the Rule 23B 
hearing. These terms have been used only to simplify which court and hearing he is 
talking about and in no way is to be interpreted as a belief that his case was remanded for 
any type of ineffectiveness of counsel issues. 
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plea. What we're arguing is that there are other issues, errors committed by counsel that 
we are discovering that we believe led to Mr. Lovell entering - which would affect both, 
you know, the knowing and voluntary aspect of the plea." R. 2990, p. 17. The Rule 23B 
court's ruling then went as follows: 
The Court: All right. In addition to the - then the - let me just then 
identify what I think we're going to do. I think before the Court is a 
responsibility to determine whether the trial court failed to strictly comply 
with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
I think the second aspect of this is in the event that there was a 
failure to strictly comply with Rule 11, can the defendant demonstrate 
prejudice. I'm not sure that that's a proper analysis, I just --1 know the 
State identified that issue in its memorandum and I have it settled in my 
own mind whether that's a proper analysis, but I'll certainly allow the State 
to pursue that and I'll consider it thoughtfully. 
Then the third part of the Court's responsibility is to determine 
whether there is a constitutional error that occurred at the plea hearing, in 
other words, invoking now the present standard for withdrawing a plea. 
Mr. Retallick: Your Honor, what about the illusory plea aspect, does that 
fall under one of those - 1 don't - I think what the Court just addressed 
was only the Rule 11 violations. I don't think the court addressed the 
analysis necessary for the issue we raised on the illusory plea. 
The Court: Well, doesn't it - isn't it subsumed under one of those two 
standards? If it isn't, then I guess you're out of luck. But I guess if I were 
doing this, I would find some basis to put it under the prior controlling 
statute or the present one. 
(R. 2990, pp. 23-24 Hearing On Motion To Clarify, September 7, 2005). 
Within the above context and the obvious confusion as to the scope of the issues 
to be dealt with, an evidentiary hearing began in August, 2006 with the same counsel that 
later requested competent counsel to be appointed. R. 2990. Additionally, it is part of 
the record of this Court that expert opinion exists that would show Mr. Lovell suffers 
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from organic brain injury. See Motion to Clarify Issues on Remand, Addendum G. 
Forensic Report of Dr. Linda Gummow. However, there is no indication that such 
evidence was ever developed, presented, or investigated further. 
Since ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally require a showing of 
prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), 
the usual process in a plea context would require investigation of, and presentation of, 
evidence showing what the previous counsel should have or could have found that would 
necessarily have influenced a decision to plead or possible plea negotiations. Claims of 
lack of investigation into issues of brain trauma, mental retardation, influence of drugs 
and alcohol are obviously important. Evidence of prior physical and sexual abuse and 
other emotional trauma would be important and investigation into those issues has been 
the standard since before Mr. Lovell's case. See, Affidavit o/D. Gilbert Athay, Exhibit 
D., Renewed Motion for Appointment of Investigator, etc. filed with this Court Feb. 4, 
2008. 
Pursuant to the discussion above, it is uncontroverted that such an investigation 
was not completed and there was significant information not discovered prior to Mr. 
Lovell's plea and never presented at the Rule 23B hearing. It should also be noted that 
counsel did not qualify under Rules 8 and 38B setting out minimum credentials for 
representation of indigent capital appeal clients. Another reason this information was not 
presented is the limitation that the Rule 23B court imposed and the view that the Rule 
23B court had that such evidence was irrelevant to the plea process. As the Rule 23B 
22 
court stated: "Lovell's other claims, such as Caine's alleged failure in not following ABA 
guidelines to hire a psychological expert during the penalty phase, are irrelevant to the 
motion to withdraw the plea, but lie more appropriately in the pending Rule 65C motion." 
(R. 2956). 
Regardless of the seriously flawed undeveloped record of the Rule 23B hearing as 
to ineffectiveness evidence, the State would have Mr. Lovell go forward and argue the 
five claims allowed by the district court in piecemeal fashion and without the context of 
Mr. Lovell's serious mental health history or any other information yet undiscovered. 
This Court has recently dealt with the failure of due diligence of counsel in a capital case 
and relied upon the ABA guidelines in finding that gross negligence on the part of 
defense counsel warranted habeas relief. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81 f^ f 90-95, 150 
P.3d 480 (Utah 2006). With the present state of the record, therefore, there simply can be 
no ineffectiveness claims that can be dealt with adequately on the merits and should only 
be dealt with after competent counsel have been allowed to conduct the required 
investigation and present discovered evidence of ineffectiveness. It should also be noted 
that present counsel for Mr. Lovell has not been allowed resources, investigators or 
experts and has been effectively limited to rely on the district court record and Mr. 
Lovell's attorney files as they stand. See Affidavit of David V. Finlayson, submitted to 
this Court as exhibit D to Renewed Motion For Appointment of Investigator, etc.. 
Therefore, Mr. Lovell respectfully requests that this Court decline to address the 
ineffectiveness of counsel issues as outside the scope of the present remand, or until full 
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investigation has been accomplished, or remand the ineffectiveness of counsel issues 
back to the district court for the appropriate investigation and'development of possible 
ineffectiveness issues. 
VIII. The State Did Not Preserve Below Its Argument That The 2005 Revision of Rule 
11 Applies to Mr. LovelPs Case. (In Response To SB. at 46-47) 
Mr. Lovell can find nowhere in the record before this Court that the State 
preserved an argument that the 2005 version of Rule 11 applies now to Mr. Lovell's case. 
Indeed, it appears that during argument before the Rule 23B court, the State was in 
agreement that the 1993 version of Rule 11 applied. See R. 2990, pp. 29-40. Since it was 
never argued, the Rule 23B court did not deal with the issue and the State should not be 
able to raise it for the first time on appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^l 1, 10 
P.3d 346. Regardless, the new Rule 11 does not change law in the long history of strict 
compliance. The State argues that Rule 1 l(k) was changed and that it now requires the 
defendant to show prejudice before prevailing on a strict compliance violation claim. 
(SB 46). However, the notes to Rule 11 state that the amendments were only meant to 
"reflect current law without any substantive changes." Advisory Committee Note, Utah 
R. Crim. P. Rule 11. Subsection k provides: 
Compliance with this Rule shall be determined by examining the record as 
a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this Rule which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply 
with this Rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a 
guilty plea. 
This subsection appears to simply reflect the state of the law requiring an additional 
showing beyond strict compliance for a collateral attack. From the committee note, we 
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are left again with the controlling case law. As stated above, since Gibbons, it is good 
cause as a matter of law to withdraw a plea if there has been a Rule 11 strict compliance 
violation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the discussion above, and previous briefing, Mr. Lovell respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the Rule 23B Court's denial of his original and renewed 
motions to withdraw his plea. 
Respectfully submitted this (j day of January, 2009. 
David V. Finlayson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Sec . 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of We, liberty or property without due process 
of law. 
S e c . 10 . [Trial by ju ry] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital 
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felon}7 cases, the 
jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legisla-
ture shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury 
consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be 
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury 
in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Sec . 12 . [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at an}7 preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discover}' is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Laws 1994, SJ.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995. 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
Rev St 1933, 103-36-1, 105-17-3, 105-22-15 Passic, 1976, 545 F 2d 1260 Arrest &=> 70(2), 
State v Jensen, 1934, 83 Utah 452, 30 P 2d 203 Criminal Law <£=> 264 
Criminal Law <&=> 261(2) 
4. Waiver 
3 Delav ^ announcing his readiness for trial and 
proceeding to trial without any form of objec-
Whatever constitutional right accused may
 t l o n t o t h e charges of the statement made by 
have had to know charges upon which he had
 c i e r k s to effect that defendant had entered a not 
been arrested, such rights were not infringed by guilty plea, and further by allowing a full trial 
delay of some 12 hours between his incarcera- on the merits as if a plea of not guilty had been 
tion in drunk tank and his arraignment the entered, defendant effectively waived his right 
following morning for murder committed in the to a formal arraignment State v Peterson, 
drunk tank 42 U S C A § 1983 Bennett v 1984, 681 P 2d 1210 Criminal Law e=> 264 
R U L E 1 1 . PLEAS 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bad shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
1051 
Rule 11 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or 
rejected by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and 
the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
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(j) W h e n a de fendan t t e n d e r s a p l e a of guilty a n d men ta l ly ill, in add i t i on to 
the o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s of this ru le , the c o u r t sha l l ho ld a h e a r i n g wi th in a 
r e a sonab l e t ime to d e t e r m i n e if the d e f e n d a n t is men ta l ly ill in a c c o r d a n c e wi th 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 1 6 a - 1 0 3 . 
(k) C o m p l i a n c e wi th this ru le sha l l be d e t e r m i n e d by e x a m i n i n g the r e c o r d 
as a whole . Any va r i ance f rom the p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d by this rule w h i c h does 
not affect subs tan t ia l r igh ts shal l be d i s r e g a r d e d . Fa i l u r e to comply wi th this 
ru le is not , by itself, sufficient g r o u n d s for a co l la te ra l a t t ack on a guil ty p lea . 
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 
2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005; November 1, 2005.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
These amendments are intended to re- ration of plea affidavits can save the court 
fleet current law without any substantive time, eliminate some of the monotony of 
changes. The addition of a requirement rote recitations of rights waived by plead-
for a finding of a factual basis in section i n g guilty, and allow a more focused and 
(e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and is in
 p r o b i n g inquiry into the facts of the of-
accordance with prior case law. E.g.
 f e n s e > t h e r e l a t ionship of the law to those 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah
 f a c t s > a n d w h e t h e r ± e p k a i s k n o w i n g r y 
1983). The rule now explicitly recognizes
 a n d v o l u n t a r i l e n t e r e c L T h e s e b e n e f i t s 
pleas under North Carolina v. Alrord, 400 ^ ^ r
 T , . , , 
fi c ->c m ci-,- 1 ^ ->-7 T VA -> A m a r e contingent on a careful and considered 
U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 .
 r , rc. , . , , , c i 
/m-rnx A * c _*L u^ r * i L • review or the affidavit by the detendant 
(1970), and sets forth the tactual basis . , , . i . r 
required for those pleas. E.g. Willett v. ™d P r o P e r c a r e b ^ J * t n a l c ° u r t t 0 v e r l ^ 
Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992). t h a t s u c h a r e v i e w h a s a c t u a l l y o c c u r r e d -
The amendments explicitly recognize T h e f i n a l paragraph of section (e) clari-
that plea affidavits, where used, may prop- f i e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t maY> b u t n e e d n o t ' 
erly be incorporated into the record when advise defendants concerning collateral 
the trial court determines that the defen- consequences of a guilty plea. The failure 
dant has read (or been read) the affidavit, to so advise does not affect the validity of a 
understands its contents, and acknowl- plea. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303 
edges the contents. State v. Maguire, 830 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 
P.2d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper incorpo- 13 (Utah 1995). 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Owens, The Case Against Plea-Bargaining, 1 
Utah B.J. 8 (Nov. 1988). 
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